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Abstract— Coordinated and targeted cyber-attacks to 
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are becoming more and more 
frequent and sophisticated. This is due to: i) the recent 
technology shift towards Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
products, and ii) new economical and socio-political 
motivations. In this paper, we discuss some of the most 
relevant security issues resulting from the adoption in CIs of 
heterogeneous network infrastructures (specifically combining 
wireless and IP trunks), and suggest techniques to detect, as 
well as to counter/mitigate attacks. We claim that techniques 
such as those we propose here should be integrated in future 
SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) 
solutions, and we discuss how we have done so in the EC-
funded MASSIF project, with respect to a real-world CI 
scenario, specifically a distributed system for power grid 
monitoring. 
Keywords— Critical Infrastructure Protection, Intrusion 
Detection and Diagnosis, Complex Event Processing , Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many daily operations currently rely on services 
provided by systems that are referred to as Critical 
Infrastructures (CIs). Typical examples of CIs are: the 
electric grid (including the emerging technologies known as 
smart grids), oil and natural gas production and distribution 
infrastructures, transportation systems, and water supply 
networks. In the past, CIs consisted of components which 
were physically and logically separated, with well-defined 
interfaces and relatively little interdependence. As market 
needs evolved towards more efficient and innovative 
services, with more demanding user requirements and 
customer expectations, utility providers had to develop CIs 
where Information Technology (IT) gained more and more 
importance. Current CIs include a number of “cyber 
components”, which collectively account for a significant 
fraction of the overall system. These cyber components are 
currently connected through heterogeneous networks, and 
they are in charge of activities that are vital to the CI, and 
ultimately to the society. In particular, independently of the 
specific characteristics of the service they provide and of the 
deployment context, virtually all CIs rely - to a significant 
extent - for their operation on the existence and on the 
dependability of the underlying network infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, the increasing interconnectivity,  complexity 
and heterogeneity of the communication networks and 
systems used to connect such cyber components also 
increase their level of vulnerability. Furthermore, the 
progressive disuse of dedicated communication 
architectures and proprietary networked components, 
together with the growing adoption of IP-based solutions, 
exposes CIs to cyber-attacks coming from the Internet [1]. 
In conclusion, current CIs are characterized by a 
vulnerability level similar to the one of other systems which 
are connected to the Internet, and it will be even more so in 
the future. This fact is particularly scaring if one considers 
the dramatic socio-economic impact that CI failures can 
have. For the above described reasons, developing 
mechanisms for protecting the underlying network 
infrastructure of a CI from attacks and failures, in order to 
ensure secure end-to-end transmission of information is of 
paramount importance. Currently, the main tool for the 
protection of complex distributed systems is Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) technology. 
Regrettably, current SIEM technology has limited ability to 
cope with network heterogeneity.  
This paper makes three important contributions. First, 
we provide a detailed treatment of the security issues 
resulting from the adoption in CIs of heterogeneous and 
novel network solutions, and specifically: Wireless Sensor 
Networks and QoS-enabled IP connections. Second, we 
propose techniques for enhancing current SIEM technology, 
by improving its capability of detecting and mitigating 
attacks targeting the heterogeneous network infrastructure 
of a CI. Third, we show how these techniques can be 
implemented with respect to a challenging real world 
scenario, specifically the Wide Area Monitoring System of a 
power grid. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 
II, we provide an overview of the current SIEM offer, and 
highlight its main limitations. In section III, we present a 
typical architecture of a SIEM system. In Section IV we 
discuss how SIEM technology might detect and mitigate 
attacks targeting heterogeneous network infrastructures, with 
respect to the case study of a power grid. Finally Section V 
closes the paper with some final remarks. 
II. SIEM TECHNOLOGY: STATE OF THE ART AND GAP 
ANALYSIS 
SIEM products emerged ten years ago as a solution to the 
problem of data overload. They are essentially a combination 
of previously unbundled security management services. A 
SIEM solution effectively combines elements of Security 
Information Management (SIM) with Security Event 
Management (SEM). One of the main features of these 
solutions is their advanced log management capabilities. Log 
management is the process of dealing with large volumes of 
computer generated log messages. The key issues with log 
management tend to be the sheer volume of the log data and 
the diversity of the logs. A SIEM product typically 
correlates, analyzes, and reports information from a variety 
of data sources such as network devices, identity 
management devices, access management devices and 
operating systems. The end result is a holistic view of IT 
security. There are a number of leading providers in this 
area, most notably HP-ArcSight, EMC-RSA, and IBM (Q1 
Labs) [2]. HP-ArcSight is viewed by most as the market 
leader in this area with their Enterprise Security Manager 
(ESM), which functions as an integrated product suite for 
collecting, analyzing, and assessing security and risk 
information.  Q1 Labs have experienced a period of rapid 
growth through their QRadar appliances due to their 
targeting of large enterprises. IBM's QRadar SIEM 
appliances provide log management, event management, 
reporting and behavioral analysis for networks and 
applications. QRadar can be deployed as an all-in-one 
solution for smaller environments, or it can be horizontally 
scaled in larger environments using specialized event 
collection, processing and console appliances. A 
distinguishing characteristic of the technology is the 
collection and processing of NetFlow data, deep packet 
inspection (DPI) and behavior analysis for all supported 
event sources. RSA, The Security Division of EMC (with 
enVision, NetWitness and Security Analytics) has one of the 
largest SIEM installed bases. However, during 2012, 
competitors continued to identify RSA enVision as the most 
frequently displaced SIEM technology. Customers report ad 
hoc query and report performance issues with the enVision 
platform as primary reasons for considering replacement. 
RSA has almost completed the transition from enVision to 
RSA Security Analytics, which incorporates traditional 
SIEM functionality and is based on the NetWitness platform. 
RSA Security Analytics provides log and full packet data 
capture, threat detection, basic security monitoring and basic 
security analytics. The most widely used Open Source SIEM 
is Open Source Security Information Management (OSSIM), 
by AlienVault, released under the GPL license. The main 
objective of OSSIM is correlating alerts issued by already 
available security tools to increase precision and recall of 
security breach detection. OSSIM provides integration, 
management, and visualization of events of more than thirty 
open source security tools, and allows the integration of new 
security devices and applications.  
We performed a thorough analysis of the available SIEM 
products and claim that current SIEM technology has two 
main limitations: 
SIEM scope is mostly limited to infrastructure. This 
results in the inability to interpret events and incidents from 
other layers - such as the service view, or the business impact 
view -and/or from the viewpoint of the service itself. The 
applicability and expressiveness of SIEM should be extended 
from the infrastructure domain, where it is mostly confined 
today, to a multi-domain view involving high-level processes 
and services, in order to perform security-related event 
processing and monitoring at the service level.  
Even at the infrastructure level, current SIEM technology 
has a limited capability of dealing with network 
heterogeneity. It is worth emphasizing that network 
heterogeneity will affect CIs more and more in the future, 
especially in the case of complex CIs, where Commercial 
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components are largely used and 
communication relies on heterogeneous network 
technologies. Cross-layer correlation of network-related 
security events is key to provide effective protection of 
current and future CIs.  
By proposing techniques for making SIEM technology 
capable of coping with network heterogeneity at the 
infrastructure level, we directly address issue 2 (since we 
improve the capability of SIEM technology of detecting and 
mitigating attacks targeting the heterogeneous network 
infrastructure of a CI), and indirectly address issue 1 (since 
we pave the way to multi-level/multi-domain security event 
processing, a key pre-requisite for improving the 
performance and the effectiveness of SIEM attack detection 
features). 
III. SIEM ARCHITECTURE 
A typical SIEM is composed of six separate parts or 
processes. These parts are the source device, log collection, 
parsing/normalization of the logs, the rule engine, log 
storage, and event monitoring and retrieval [3]. The first 
component of a SIEM architecture is the source device that 
produces information and feeds such information into the 
SIEM. The source device can be an actual network device, 
such as a router, switch, or some type of server, but it can 
also be logs from an application or just about any other data 
that can be acquired, and then stored and processed in the 
SIEM. Reports on normal or suspicious activities are 
generated by applications (Web Server, DHCP, DNS, etc.), 
appliances (router, switch, etc.) or operating systems (Unix, 
Mac OS, Windows, etc.). Typically, most of the reports are 
logs in application specific format. Log Collection 
component is responsible for gathering logs from source 
devices. Two fundamental collection methods are used to 
retrieve logs from the source devices: the push method, i.e. 
the source device sends its logs to the SIEM system, and the 
pull method, i.e. the SIEM system reaches out and retrieves 
the logs from the source device. Parsing and Normalization 
component is in charge of parsing the information contained 
in the logs and translating it from the native format to a 
format manageable by the SIEM engine. Moreover, the 
Normalization component is in charge of filling the reports 
with extra information required during the correlation 
process. Rule and Correlation Engines trigger alerts and 
produce detailed reports; they work on the huge amount of 
logs generated by the source devices. The Rule Engine raises 
the alert in case specific conditions are detected in the logs, 
while the Correlation Engine correlates information in order 
to produce a more concise and precise report. The correlation 
task consists of matching multiple standard events from 
different sources into a single correlated event. This task is 
performed in order to make incident response procedure 
more immediate and effective because it generates a single 
event to be processed by the downstream SIEM components 
instead of the multiple events coming from various source 
devices. Log Storage component stores logs for retention 
purposes and historical queries; usually the storage is based 
on a database, a plain text file or binary data. Monitoring 
component allows for the interaction between the SIEM user 
and the SIEM framework. Interactions include report 
visualization, incident handling, policy and rule creation, 
database querying, asset analysis, vulnerability view, event 
drilling down, and system maintenance. 
IV. IMPROVING SIEM ABILITY TO DEAL WITH NETWORK 
HETEROGENEITY: THE POWER GRID CASE STUDY 
In this section, we show how an enhanced SIEM system, 
such as the one developed in the context of the MASSIF 
project [4], can be used to detect attacks exploiting specific 
vulnerabilities affecting the network trunks which compose 
the communication layer supporting a Critical Infrastructure. 
The basic idea is to collect information at several 
architectural levels and from different domains, using 
multiple security probes, which are deployed as a distributed 
architecture, to perform sophisticated correlation analysis of 
attack symptoms. In order to effectively assess the security 
status of the CI being protected, the results of the monitoring 
activities performed at different observation points need to 
be correlated. Such observation points are distributed 
throughout the network infrastructure as well as throughout 
the system to be protected. The more diverse the information 
sources and the processing methods, the more effective the 
correlation process. The deployment of probes at different 
observation points located in the communication layer and at 
different architectural levels (network level, operating 
system level, application level, etc.), allows to fulfill the 
requirement of diversity of the information sources. By 
exploiting information diversity, it is possible to improve the 
accuracy of the detection process, as well as to implement 
diagnostic capabilities. 
In order to process and correlate the huge amount of 
heterogeneous monitoring data the proposed SIEM solution 
relies on the Complex Event Processing (CEP) technology. 
We present our solution with respect to a case study that well 
illustrates how the deployment of heterogeneous networking 
technologies impacts the security of a CI, specifically a Wide 
Area Monitoring System for power grid. In the following, we 
provide a brief description of a typical power grid 
infrastructure. An Electrical Power System (EPS) (or 
Electrical System) includes all the devices necessary to 
produce and to transport electric power from production 
plants to final users. The EPS is normally organized in 
islands, named grids or power grids, interconnected for 
increased reliability and availability. Within an island 
everything is synchronous, that is operates at the same 
frequency, while different islands can operate at different 
frequencies. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are devices 
that use Global Positioning System (GPS) signals as a 
common time source and measure power system quantities at 
different locations across a wide-area system at the same 
instant in time. A reference architecture for power grid 
monitoring is composed of PMUs disseminated throughout 
the grid, Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) collecting and 
correlating measurement data from the PMUs, and a 
SuperPDC, which is a central PDC that gathers measurement 
data from all remote PDCs and PMUs and makes it available 
to a visualization station. An accurate description of the 
power grid monitoring architecture is provided in [5], 
whereas more details about security issues in power grid 
monitoring infrastructure can be found in [6]. The 
communication infrastructure supporting a power grid 
includes several network technologies, such as Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs), IP-based wired network, and 
satellite network. Due to the low cost and high function, 
wireless sensors have been deployed in power grid wildly 
[7]. WSNs are applied through the entire process of the smart 
grid i.e. from the generation, transmission and distribution, 
and the consumer side. Some of the applications include load 
management and control, wireless automatic meter reading 
(WAMR), equipment fault diagnostic, remote monitoring, 
fault detection, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), 
and residential energy management. In [8] an in depth 
review on the application characteristics and traffic 
requirements of several emerging smart grid applications is 
performed. In order to meet such requirements utilities from 
all over the word are now facing the key challenge of finding 
the most appropriate technology. Today, the most widely 
used protocol for communicating power grid measurement 
data is IEEE C37.118 that can be transmitted over TCP, 
UDP or higher level protocols. The C37.118 standard is 
usually implemented as a client/server communication 
protocol, where the Phasor Measurement Unit acts as server 
and the Phasor Data Concentrator as a client. QoS-enabled 
IP networks are the most suitable communication technology 
for ensuring a resilient transmission of smart grid monitoring 
data from the PMUs to the PDC. Fig. 1 shows a view of a 
Wide Area Monitoring Infrastructure for power grid.  
 
Fig. 1. A schematic view of a power grid monitoring infrastructure 
The time synchronization between different PMUs is 
required to understand the global status of the power grid at 
the same time. This is because events occurring in one part 
of the grid affect operations elsewhere, and they also extend 
to other systems beyond the grid that rely on stable power. 
Time synchronized measurements produced by PMUs are 
called synchrophasors. In order to obtain simultaneous 
measurements of phasors detected from different PMUs 
installed across a wide area of the power system, it is 
necessary to synchronize these times, so that all phasor 
measurements belonging to the same time are truly 
simultaneous. Each PMU uses a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) receiver to take a unique timestamp within the global 
system. One of the main problems affecting smart grid 
monitoring is the spoofing of the GPS signal provided to the 
GPS receiver. The GPS signal can be forged in order to 
mislead the GPS receiver that uses it [9]. 
In the following we first discuss the security issues 
introduced by the adoption of the above mentioned 
networking technologies and then we present the way the 
MASSIF SIEM system can be used to protect the CI against 
the discussed cyber-security threats. 
A. Protecting the WSN trunk 
A well-known attack that can be launched by an intruder 
node against a WSN is commonly referred to as Sleep 
Deprivation Attack. This attack can be launched in a variety 
of ways depending on both the particular routing protocol 
and its specific implementation [10]. As an example it is 
possible to send many broadcast routing packets. The attack 
is amplified if the fake routing packets force some nodes to 
change their parents, since in this case each fooled node 
notifies the detected change to all its neighbours, thus 
generating more traffic. Another way to conduct the attack is 
by sending unnecessary routing requests (RREQ), or by 
sending forged routing reply (RREP) packets that force the 
creation of loops in the WSN. In this case, due to the loops, 
packets are forwarded and stay alive longer, hence resulting 
in unnecessary retransmissions and additional routing 
messages. The attack has two negative effects on the WSN: 
i) the discharge of batteries of all the nodes along the route 
(the path identified by triple arrows in Fig. 2) from the 
malicious node to the base station; and, ii) a Denial of 
Service for those nodes whose path towards the base station 
(identified with the symbol “x” in Fig. 2) crosses the 
attacked overloaded path to the base station. 
 
Fig. 2. Sleep deprivation attack and its effects 
In a realistic scenario, all packets reaching the base 
station are typically forwarded to a proxy, which in turn 
forwards them, on a TCP/IP channel, to the application 
server for final delivery to the real consumer (Fig. 3). Every 
data packet generated by a node and reaching the base station 
is encapsulated into the payload of a TCP packet and sent to 
the application server via a VPN. In case of an attack, all 
packets sent by the malicious node will reach the application 
server which will recognize them as valid packets (as they 
are duplicates of valid packets), thus resulting in a 
manipulated view of the field.  
 
Fig. 3. Deployment scenario for the WS 
As an example in our power grid scenario, the attacker 
may prevent some nodes from sending measures to the 
related collector, thus hiding changes in the power grid 
conditions. In order to detect this WSN targeted attacks, we 
developed a SIEM Correlation Engine capable of correlating 
alarms given by a WSN security probe and results given by 
an application level probe used to protect the visualization 
server. The WSN security probe generates alarms based on 
the analysis of the network and periodically (e.g. every 
minute) calculates the packet generation rate at every node. 
Such data are sent to the correlation module that analyzes 
them together with alarms triggered by the application level 
probe for packet arrival rates at the application server higher 
than a threshold value defined in the training stage. By 
correlating the data gathered by these two kinds of probes it 
is possible to detect the sleep deprivation attack and even to 
identify the ID of the malicious node. The identity of the 
malicious node can hence be taken into account while 
applying remediation and recovery actions. The SIEM 
system can in fact trigger a reaction strategy to stop or at 
least mitigate the effect of the ongoing attack. Strategies 
might be selected from a list of possible options, possibly 
reordered based on their effectiveness with respect to the 
diagnostic results (e.g., attacker ID, level of damage, class of 
attack), and sequentially applied until the attack is stopped. 
Examples of possible reaction strategies for the described 
attack are (sorted by level of effectiveness): (i) over the air 
re-programming of the malicious node, (ii) switch-off (i.e., 
setting to sleep mode) of the malicious node, and (iii) 
isolation of the malicious node and if necessary manual 
shutdown and re-programming of the node. 
B. Protecting the wired network trunk 
In this section we illustrate how the MASSIF SIEM 
system can be used to protect an IP-based network segment 
composing the power grid monitoring infrastructure against 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Usually, a 
DDoS attack abuses network protocols in order to saturate 
the resources of a network server, thus preventing legitimate 
users from using the provided service. Attackers typically 
attempt to saturate the limited resources of the victim 
without directly violating it. A common way to perform a 
DDoS attack is to first of all compromise other hosts which 
the attacker will eventually orchestrate during the actual 
distributed attack. A typical DDoS attack scenario involves 
several components widely distributed throughout the 
network: a “master” that initiates and orchestrates the 
distributed attack, several “agents”, or “zombies”, which 
receive commands from the master and launch the real 
attack, and a target node, which represents the victim of the 
attack. We herein assume that the attacker perpetrates a 
DDoS attack against a web based component of a CI (such as 
the power grid monitoring application server). In this 
scenario the attacker firstly needs to “recruit” the necessary 
computing power. Indeed, the greater the available 
computing power, the stronger the effects of the attack, since 
the capability of the attacker to saturate the victim's 
resources increases. For this reason, the attacker needs to 
opportunely violate several hosts, in order to recruit them as 
“accomplices”. There exist several ways of compromising 
agent nodes. For example, a Trojan horse might be exploited, 
allowing the attacker to download an agent on the violated 
machine. Weaknesses in the software code that accepts 
remote connections can also be exploited for the recruitment 
process. Once the victim has been identified, the attacker 
launches the attack by running the attack code on the master 
host. The master communicates with agents in order to 
instruct them about the attack to perform against the target 
by means of common packet flooding procedures. The 
distributed flooding is properly orchestrated by the master in 
order to amplify the effects of the DDoS attack. Let us 
assume that each agent perpetrates a SYN FLOODING 
attack to the victim host. SYN FLOODING is a well-known 
type of attack, wherein the agent sends a succession of TCP 
SYN requests to the victim without completing the tree-way 
handshake process with the expected ACK message. Since 
the victim reserves memory for handling the connection 
associated with every TCP synchronization request, such 
attack can rapidly saturate the victim host's resources if the 
SYN request sending rate exceeds the threshold defined by 
the timeout mechanism for the synchronization process on 
the server site. The detection process is performed by 
monitoring the system under attack at two different levels: a 
detection module analyzes traffic metrics and compares their 
values with specific patterns of activities, and alerts the 
SIEM system if anomalies are detected; another detection 
module monitors the target machine by controlling operating 
system parameters and identifies anomalous values of such 
parameters, which are symptoms of the ongoing attack. The 
SIEM system correlates these two classes of symptoms and 
spots a SYN FLOODING attack. Then, it sends an alarm to 
the reaction component. The level of confidence of the 
decision-making process depends on the seriousness of the 
symptoms as well as on the presence of both classes of 
symptoms. Network monitoring probes are disseminated 
throughout the network in order to effectively observe the 
evidence of the distributed attack. The remediation process is 
initiated with the reception of an alert event. We assume that 
the PMU and the PDC are connected through a wired 
network exploited by both legitimate users, and by attackers 
performing their malicious actions. The attackers target a 
web server, and attack packets flow through one of the 
routers shared with the trunk between PMU and PDC as 
well. Due to the effects of the ongoing attack, the 
intermediate shared router is not able to satisfy all incoming 
requests any longer. This affects also the power grid 
monitoring packets which are no longer forwarded by the 
compromised router, resulting in loss of monitoring and 
control data. The reaction strategy might consist in a routing 
mechanism that allows the communication infrastructure to 
be resilient to both node/link failures and attacks. The basic 
assumption is that packets belonging to a single flow can be 
split at the edge of the network and sent through the core 
infrastructure along two or more node-disjoint paths. The 
proposed routing technique, called ‘splitting’, relies on the 
possibility to engineer the network traffic by explicitly 
routing flows (or even parts of them) and can be effectively 
realized in MPLS (Multi-Protocol Label Switching) 
networks [11] [12]. Given the above assumptions, standard 
resilience techniques like, e.g., re-routing of label switched 
paths, can be effectively applied in case the SIEM system 
detects an attack: alternative paths can be calculated and the 
traffic which is suffering from the presence of attack packets 
can be promptly re-routed along safe links. In the depicted 
scenario, the presence of splitting helps both preserve the 
control traffic from being impaired by the attack flows and 
allow for the prompt application of backup reaction 
strategies. As an example, in case the smart grid data traffic 
is routed along link-disjoint paths, the path including the 
attacked router might be disabled and the portion of smart 
grid traffic that it was serving might be immediately re-
routed along the already available safe path. Thanks to re-
routing the attack does not have a strong impact on the 
performance experienced by the smart grid data traffic. 
C. Protecting the power grid infrastructure from GPS 
spoofing attack 
PMUs are devices that use GPS signals as a common 
time source and analyze the waveforms of different 
transmission lines at different locations across a wide-area 
system at the same moment. In particular they perform a 
sampling of the waveforms provided by transmission lines 
and generate the phasors. These phasors are timestamped 
using the same clock provided by the GPS receiver. These 
synchronized phasors are called synchrophasors. Such 
timestamps can be used to compare collected synchrophasors 
with microsecond precision. In fact, the PDC gathers the data 
provided by different PMUs and it performs a comparison 
between the synchrophasors to assess the status of power 
grid. A PDC can exchange phasors with PDCs at other 
locations to perform a wide are monitoring. Civilian GPS 
signals are known to be susceptible to spoofing attacks 
which make GPS receivers in range believe that they reside 
at locations different than their real physical locations. In 
[13] the authors present several GPS spoofing attack 
detection techniques. Such techniques rely on signal strength 
and use a threshold-based approach to detect GPS spoofing 
attacks. A possible technique consists in monitoring the 
absolute GPS signal strength, i.e. the observed signal 
strength is compared to the expected one. If the absolute 
value of the observed signal exceeds some preset threshold, 
then an alert is raised. Another technique is to monitor the 
relative GPS signal strength. An extremely large change in 
relative signal strength could be a symptom of an ongoing 
attack trying to generate a counterfeit GPS signal to override 
the true satellite GPS signals. If the signal increases beyond 
some preset threshold, an alarm would be generated. An 
extension of the above two techniques implies that the 
relative and absolute signal strengths are tested individually 
for each of the incoming satellite signals. The basic 
assumption is that t if the signal characteristics are too 
perfect, there is probably something wrong and an alert 
should be issued. A further technique consists in monitoring 
satellite identification codes and number of satellite signals 
received. Many commercial GPS receivers display satellite 
identification information, but do not record this data or 
compare to previously recorded data. Keeping track of both 
the number of satellite signals received and the satellite 
identification codes over time may prove helpful in 
determining if foul play is occurring. The proposed SIEM 
system can be used to detect GPS spoofing attacks since it 
includes three security probes, each implementing one of the 
first three above mentioned detection techniques. The alerts 
raised by the security probes are sent to a correlation engine 
which processes and correlates the received alarms and then 
makes the final decision on whether the detected anomalies 
are symptoms of an ongoing attacks or not. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper addresses a key issue of current and future 
CIs, namely effective protection of the heterogeneous 
network infrastructure on which they rely. The paper makes 
three important contributions. First, it provides a detailed 
treatment of the security issues resulting from the adoption in 
CIs of heterogeneous network solutions, and specifically: 
Wireless Sensor Networks, satellite networks, and QoS-
enabled IP connections. Second, it proposes techniques for 
enhancing current SIEM technology, by improving its 
capability of detecting and mitigating attacks targeting the 
heterogeneous network infrastructure of a CI. Third, it shows 
how these techniques can be implemented with respect to a 
challenging real world example, specifically the power grid 
monitoring infrastructure. 
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